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The Economics of Land Markets and their Regulation   
Paul C. Cheshire & Christian A.L. Hilber 
Department of Geography, London School of Economics 
Adam Smith devoted half as much again to the analysis of the ‘rent of land’ as he did to the 
‘wages of labour’; Alfred Marshall in his Book IV, on the Agents of Production, had 5 times as 
much material on land as he had on labour and an additional separate chapter in Book V on 
urban land; Paul Samuelson’s classic Economics still devoted chapters to both land and labour 
and land came first: but labour got more coverage. A modern economics syllabus will 
acknowledge three factors of production – land, labour and capital (land still usually comes 
first) - but unless the student is one of that almost extinct breed, an agricultural economist, 
land will likely never be mentioned again.  
When Adam Smith was writing somewhere around 12% of the population of Europe lived in 
cities and even in the most urbanised country – England – it was barely more than 20 percent 
(Bairoch, 1988). Glasgow and Edinburgh combined had a population of about 100,000 
although Scotland was not far behind England in urbanisation. According to Piketty (2014) the 
value of agricultural land in Britain was more than three times that of annual GDP around 
1775 but well under one tenth by 1960. It is not surprising that economists lost interest in land. 
But land is making a comeback. Other data in Piketty suggest one reason. While all residential 
property in Britain was worth about the same as annual GDP all the way from 1700 to about 
1960, by 2010 it was worth three times as much. By the end of 2013 houses accounted for 61% 
of the UK’s net worth: up from 48.7% 20 years previously (ONS, 2013). Applying the rule of 
thumb that the rebuild value of the stock of residential property is roughly equal to the total 
value of GDP, then the value of the land on which the housing stock sat went from 1.28 times 
that of GDP in 1992 to 1.74 times 2013 UK GDP. The more painstaking calculations of Knoll et 
al., (2014) conclude that the UK was in fact far from the top of the international league in terms 
of the contribution land price increases made to total house price increases in the period 1950 
to 2012 (with almost all the increase in land prices taking place post-1970): they estimated land 
prices contributed from 74 to 96 percent to the increase in house prices with the greatest 
contribution in Finland. The relative value of residential land has risen in all countries for 
which there are estimates.  In the US, although still lower than in the UK, it rose from a lower 
base and shows more regional variation (Piketty, 2014). 
There seem to be at least two main reasons for this dramatic turnaround in the value of land 
relative to other assets and to GDP over the past 50 years or so. The first is the resurgence of 
agglomeration economies leading to a resurgence of major cities. Agglomeration economies 
are a form of externality affecting both total factor productivity but also welfare directly via 
agglomeration economies in consumption. The classic discussion of agglomeration economies 
in production is usually traced to Marshall (1890) although the basic ideas go back at least to 
Adam Smith and the division of labour. Marshall’s exposition of why cities provided more 
productive locations was in terms of manufacturing and specialisation. But the decline in 
manufacturing, the increase in firm and plant sizes with their internal economies of scale and, 
above all, the overall reduction in transport costs and the switch to road transport for goods 
(Anas and Moses, 1979) caused both a diaspora of manufacturing from cities and a reduction 
in the importance of agglomeration economies in industry. This process, from after WWII until 
around 1980, was the period of ‘urban decline’ especially obvious in the great cities generated 
by the industrial revolution – the Glasgows, Detroits and Essens of the industrialised 
countries.  
However to the initial surprise of those questioning the ability of cities to survive (Pettengill 
and Uppal, 1974) and the predictors of the death of distance (Cairncross, 1997) from about 
1980 cities have made a striking comeback (see, for example, Cheshire 1995; 2006; Kahn and 
Costa, 2000). The growing sectors of advanced economies, tradeable services such as finance or 
business services, R & D, Higher Education, Media or cultural industries, are subject to 
particularly important agglomeration economies (Graham, 2009); and so are expanding 
consumption activities such as tourism, museum visiting or live performance and sports 
events. Both jobs and people, especially the college educated with more spending power, have 
been increasingly attracted to cities. This has bid up the price of land and housing, the more so 
in the more central parts of the largest cities.  
If the resurgence of cities, promoted by the renewed force of agglomeration economies in both 
production and consumption, is one reason for the rise in the relative value of land, the second 
is the continuing rise in real incomes coupled with the strong income elasticity of demand for 
living space, whether in houses or gardens or indeed in parks and recreational areas. If land 
for living on were in perfectly elastic supply this would not increase its relative price. But it is 
not. Partly this may be because of agglomeration economies themselves making space in 
larger cities more desirable and, all else equal, space is more expensive the larger a city is (as is 
explored in section I of this collection); but partly (as the readings in section IV of this 
collection make clear) because policy has increasingly constrained urban land supply by 
restrictive land use regulation – planning or zoning. In other words, to misquote Mark Twain, 
‘buy land they’ve stopped us making any more’. Because, of course, until urban growth 
boundaries or Green Belts were imposed from the 1950s onwards, a major activity was making 
more urban land: mainly by building new transport systems (except in the Netherlands where 
they really did make land). So in the past 50 or 60 years, in more and more of the richest 
countries, policy has all but stopped the ‘production’ of urban land. And as demand has risen 
with rising incomes (and population) so has the real price of land. 
The salience of land and property markets in both the popular conscientiousness and in terms 
of economic significance has correspondingly risen. This has been partly, but still only partly, 
reflected in the work of economists. As one of us remarked in the introduction to a previous 
Edward Elgar volume (Cheshire and Duranton, 2004) there has been a surge of papers on 
urban or spatial economics published in mainstream economics journals over the past 15 years 
and “… this reflects the renewed interest of the economics profession…”  
This renewed interest of mainstream economists in land and land markets is reflected in this 
volume: 24 percent of our selections are from front ranking general interest economics journals 
and published since 2000; another 21 percent are from similarly recent issues of the leading 
‘field’ journal in urban economics.  
But as was implied above, interest in land markets was powerful in the early stages of the 
intellectual development of the subject because land itself was so economically important. 
Many of the pioneers of economics, notably David Ricardo – made powerful contributions still 
embedded in current thought. Ricardo is not represented here but a less known economist of 
that period, the extraordinary Johann Heinrich von Thünen, is, if indirectly. Von Thünen is 
still underappreciated as a pioneering economic thinker – perhaps partly because so little of 
his work has been translated into English, and that which has, is so powerfully about land and 
spatial economics. His seminal work Isolated State, on analysing how market forces with 
transport costs give rise to distinct and predictable patterns of agricultural land use and 
relative prices, is the exception. But as our first reading makes clear his contribution was far 
wider and was extraordinary. 
William Alonso (1960) extended von Thünen’s central concept of bid rent curves to an urban 
context in which the focal point is the Central Business District (CBD) where jobs are 
concentrated. This implies the only significant spatial characteristic of a location is its distance 
from the city centre. Von Thünen’s farmland, where distance from the market was the driving 
force determining the agricultural use of land, becomes land for housing, plants, offices, and 
infrastructure. Rural economics morphs into urban economics where the main objective is to 
explain the internal structure of cities: how land is distributed among activities and why cities 
have one or several CBDs. So we also have to have older thought represented in this volume. 
Much of the fundamental economic thinking and analysis of land and land markets has 
historic roots since land was so salient in the early development of the subject. 
Somewhat reluctantly we decided not to have the founding ideas explained by their 
originators. Von Thünen is represented by two review papers; Ricardo is not represented 
directly at all and Henry George again by a review paper in the last section dealing with how 
taxation and local public goods interact with land markets. Our oldest paper is a classic but 
dates only from 1956 – a paper by Charles Tiebout which Google Scholar records as having 
nearly 15,000 cites (and counting); 38 times as many as the extraordinarily original and path 
breaking work of von Thünen. 
We divided the collection into five sections.  The first two contain papers on the theory of land 
markets. The first of these provides a historical overview through to the development of the 
powerful ‘monocentric city model’ – the founding contribution to what was called the ‘New 
Urban Economics’ in the early 1970s. Section II provides readings which move theory forward, 
in particular to provide insight into multicentric cities, the role of agglomeration economies 
and how these interact with urban land markets and the land market aspects of urban 
dynamics. Section III is devoted to the issue of ‘what gets capitalised?’ This provides an 
explanation of why land markets are so important in terms of social welfare and, in particular, 
in the distribution of overall social welfare. Section IV concentrates on land market regulation 
and the economic effects of planning or zoning. Not only is this an area to which the editors 
have themselves contributed but it has rapidly developed over the past 15 years or so. It is of 
growing interest to economists and policy makers alike as there is increasing recognition of 
how widespread and significant the economic impacts of land use regulation are. The April 4th 
edition of The Economist in 2015 devoted both the editorial and a major article to the subject, for 
example. The final section looks at studies of land markets in the context of understanding 
better both local public goods and access to them and the role of land in (local) tax. 
 
 I FOUNDATIONS AND ANALYTICAL ORIGINS   
Our first two readings are different perspectives, by two very different economists, on the 
work of von Thünen. Reading [1] is by Paul Samuelson, the most influential economist of the 
modern era and the first winner of the Nobel Prize. As he says, von Thünen is, amongst 
geographers and location theorists, a ‘founding God’ while he is all but unknown to 
economists. He was born in 1783, into a landed family in norther Germany, and was 
practically employed running his family estates for most of his life. But he had a remarkably 
original and analytical mind. His theoretical contributions arose from studying precisely what 
he did – a point emphasised in Reading [2] by Colin Clark.  Von Thünen’s contribution to the 
economics of land markets arose from a very simple but formally derived general equilibrium 
model where there is a single central market (the town), homogenous land but transport costs 
which vary by type of crop. In passing, Samuelson notes von Thünen devised – almost 
incidentally – the idea of ‘iceberg’ transport costs elaborated by Samuelson himself in his 
famous article (Samuelson, 1954a). In von Thünen’s abstract rural landscape, land use would 
become specialised in concentric rings, with the choice of product or crop in each ring 
determined by transport costs of the crop. Von Thünen was university educated and 
intellectually curious. He was aware of the work of Smith and Ricardo but, according to 
Samuelson, he had already grasped the essentials of this model by the time he was 20 years 
old; considerably ahead of Ricardo’s work on rent theory. In the world in which he existed, 
however, pressure to publish did not exist and his Isolated State did not appear until 1827. But 
his contribution went far beyond just this simple model of land use in a rural world with high 
transport costs. He introduced marginal analysis and the analysis of the returns to labour and 
to capital as well as land. He made a great advance in formal modelling and the use of 
mathematics. He also conceived of and analysed the concept of general equilibrium. All on the 
basis of an almost introspective rumination on his estate accounts. 
Colin Clark [Reading 2] was an entirely different type of economist to Samuelson. He was an 
applied and almost self-taught economist who made startling contributions to, for example, 
the development of national income accounting (Clark, 1932), to various tools of locational 
analysis, such as ‘economic potential’ and empirical generalisations such as the urban 
population density function (Clark, 1951). In the later part of his career he was an agricultural 
and development economist and his contribution here draws on that side of his work, as well 
as his interest in locational analysis. He reviews von Thünen’s contribution as an informed 
agricultural economist with a powerful historical perspective and insight. As an economist he 
recognises both the wider importance of von Thünen’s insights and theoretical contribution 
but he shows how it was based on an extraordinarily detailed record of and inspired 
interpretation of the practical conditions of early 19th Century German rural conditions. 
We now move forward 150 years to the development of modern urban economics and the 
analysis of urban land markets. William Alonso [Reading 3] is represented by his earliest work 
– a short article of 1960 – rather than the better known book of his PhD thesis, of 1964. It is the 
bare bones of his adaptation of the von Thünen model (explicitly acknowledged) to an urban 
context with only two urban land users: businesses in the Central Business District (CBD) and 
residents. But the driving force is there: the trade-off of land costs against transport costs. So, 
given that jobs and therefore income earning opportunities are concentrated in the CBD, the 
consumers’ trade-off is between higher costs of transport and lower prices of space. 
Equilibrium entails all land available for consumption being consumed given the price and 
consumers of land being indifferent between locations despite the price of land varying 
systematically by location with respect to the CBD. In turn this implies the powerful insight 
that, in equilibrium, land prices vary systematically with distance from the CBD and so land 
consumption and residential densities similarly vary. Land prices, land consumption and so 
urban density all drop out of this simple model because of the properties required of 
equilibrium. Alonso also hints at, but does not here develop, the implications of different types 
of business uses with location contributing differently to their profits, and different types of 
households – for example many or few children, high or low income – with different 
preferences for land compared to other goods and different abilities to pay, potentially leading 
to different residential locational choices. He also suggests how one could incorporate 
asymmetric transport costs or multiple employment concentrations. 
Mills [Reading 4] – still faithful to von Thünen – puts his emphasis on production functions 
and factor substitution as land prices vary. This allows him to focus on how the fabric of cities 
varies systematically as land prices increase towards the CBD and land is substituted out of 
the construction process. He goes on to show that if one assumes that there are economies and 
diseconomies of scale this leads also to not just cities but cities of different sizes. While he is 
making strong simplifying assumptions Mills is able formally to demonstrate not only the 
properties of urban equilibrium described above (the simultaneous determination of the price 
of land its allocation between uses and its density of occupation) but also the emergence of 
cities of different sizes and a differentiated form of the urban built environment.  
Our final reading in this introductory section [Reading 5] is by Capozza and Helsley (1989). 
This moves the monocentric urban model into a dynamic context. It shows how the price of 
land and its rent may in these circumstances diverge as expectations about future patterns of 
change get capitalised into prices but not reflected in rents. Development may become 
discontinuous. We might think of this as an explanation of how ’urban sprawl’ naturally arises 
as part of a dynamic but efficient process. This is an important and widely cited contribution 
although in a world where ‘urban containment’ is frequently imposed by policy, the 
discontinuity in land values at the urban edge arising from the effects of expectations analysed 
by Capozza and Helsley may be dwarfed in practice by regulated land scarcity (see Cheshire 
and Sheppard 2005); and the longer the policy of containment has been imposed the more 
significant its relative effect on land value discontinuity is likely to become. 
 
II BEYOND THE MONOCENTRIC MODEL   
The monocentric city model – pioneered during the 1960s by Alonso (1964), Muth (1969) and 
Mills (1967 and 1972) – laid the foundation of much of modern urban economic analysis. The 
model describes a particular urban spatial structure with firms concentrating in one focal point 
– the CBD – and households residing around and commuting to the CBD. The model evolved 
during a time when cities were still considered to be largely ‘monocentric’, with employment 
concentrated in the CBD and households commuting to this centre. Since the 1960s, however, 
many cities have become less and less ‘monocentric’ driven by suburbanisation of households 
and decentralisation of firms. A new strand of literature – beyond the monocentric model – 
has emerged.  
Reading [6], Mieszkowski and Mills (1993), describes the so called suburbanisation 
phenomenon of households and the decentralisation of firms and synthesises the two main 
theoretical explanations; the natural evolution theory and the fiscal-social problems approach. 
The natural evolution theory describes the suburbanisation process largely as consequence of 
rising real incomes over time, technological progress in intra-urban transportation and house 
building and changes over time in the comparative advantage of different income groups at 
commuting longer distances to work. The fiscal-social problems approach can be considered to 
be a generalisation of the Tiebout (1956) model. The emphasis is on fiscal and social problems 
of central cities such as high taxes, low quality of public goods and services, racial tensions, 
crime or congestion and pollution. In a setting where heterogeneous households sort 
according to preferences for local public goods and services, affluent households will try to 
avoid redistributive taxes by residing in richer, income-stratified communities and this process 
may be reinforced by exclusionary and fiscally motivated land use controls. Mieszkowski and 
Mills conclude that both theories interact and so both help us understand the suburbanisation 
process. 
Whereas in the monocentric model land use by firms (in the CBD) and residents (outside the 
CBD) are strictly separated and mixed land use does not exist, Reading [7], Wheaton (2004), 
points out that nowadays in the United States actual employment is almost as dispersed as 
residences. The paper goes on to show that this urban form can easily be generated in a model 
that assumes land can have mixed rather than exclusive use at any location. At one extreme, 
very high agglomerative forces, long commutes and high congestion levels will lead to 
concentrated employment in a CBD. At the other extreme, if agglomerative forces are low, 
dispersed employment, zero commutes and an absence of congestion is the outcome. 
On the empirical side, Reading [8], McDonald and McMillen (2000), provides a fascinating 
‘snapshot’ of the suburbanisation and decentralisation process and provides some empirical 
micro-foundation of the factors that determine the dispersion of employment and residences. 
McDonald and McMillen explore the determinants of suburban real estate development in the 
residential, commercial and industrial sectors by focusing on one particular US metropolitan 
area, Chicago, and the period between 1990 and 1996. Their empirical findings illustrate the 
importance of employment sub-centres and highway interchanges for attracting industrial and 
commercial developments. Residential development was attracted to a particular employment 
sub-centre. It also formed some clusters of its own in between major highways.  
Reading [9], Burchfield et al. (2006), another empirical contribution, describes and helps 
understand a related phenomenon – urban sprawl – and identifies its determinants. The 
authors demonstrate that, perhaps surprisingly, overall sprawl in the United States remained 
largely unchanged between 1976 and 1992 but that this varied dramatically across 
metropolitan areas. They show how certain geographical features (ground water availability 
and rugged terrain), decentralized employment, early public transport infrastructure, 
uncertainty about metropolitan growth, and unincorporated land in the urban fringe, all 
increased sprawl. 
While Readings [8] and [9] focus on development at the periphery of urban areas, Reading 
[10], Koster et al. (2014), is concerned about the form of the CBD. Urban land should properly 
be thought of as urban space, and this paper, in a way which is complementary to Reading [4] 
by Mills, deals with its vertical dimension and the agglomeration economies associated with it. 
Koster and co-authors argue that the presence of many tall, high-rise office buildings in the 
CBD cannot be explained by standard urban economic models alone (higher land prices 
meaning land is substituted out of buildings so they become taller). They show that Dutch 
firms are willing to pay a substantial premium for space in taller buildings, presumably due to 
a combination of within-building agglomeration economics, a landmark and a view effect.  
The standard monocentric city model builds on a number of restrictive assumptions. These 
assumptions were increasingly challenged. One important assumption of the standard model 
raised particular attention: the assumption of perfectly malleable housing. In some sense the 
city is assumed to be rebuilt from scratch in every period. The standard model thus ignores the 
fact that the housing stock is durable but depreciates. A number of urban growth models, 
reviewed in Brueckner (2000), have enhanced the standard framework by assuming either that 
housing is irreversible or can be redeveloped according to obsolescence conditions. Reading 
[11], Rosenthal and Helsley (1994), provide a direct empirical test of the durable housing 
theories by exploring the mechanisms that lead to redevelopment of individual parcels of 
land.  Using data for Vancouver, B.C., they first estimate the price of vacant and developed 
land. They then go on to demonstrate that housing is redeveloped when the price of vacant 
land exceeds the price of land in its current use, providing support for theoretical models of 
urban spatial growth.  
Reading [12], Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), also draws on this literature on durability and 
urban development. Its seminal contribution, however, is that it shifts the focus towards urban 
decline. Glaeser and Gyourko point out that new supply – at least in cities that are not tightly 
regulated – is elastic in the upswing when prices rise faster than construction costs, but the 
housing stock is nearly perfectly inelastic in bust phases, because the existing housing stock is 
durable. Put differently; the housing supply curve is kinked. Thus, cities exhibit asymmetric 
responses in periods of growth and decline. Declining cities initially suffer price declines 
rather than population losses. Moreover, the combination of inexpensive housing and weak 
labour demand in declining cities attracts households with low levels of human capital.  
Conversion of land from agricultural to urban use is not only irreversible but also associated 
with uncertainty. Reading [13], Titman (1985), made an important contribution to the literature 
by introducing and applying real option theory to real estate. Titman points out that “valuing 
the vacant land as a potential building site is not […] straightforward since the type of 
building that will eventually be built on the land, as well as the future real estate prices, are 
uncertain.” Titman’s model yields a valuation equation for pricing vacant lots and provides a 
strong intuition about the conditions under which it is rational to postpone irreversible 
investment decisions [to build or not build] until a future date. The key insight is that “a 
vacant lot can be viewed as an option to purchase one of a number of different possible 
buildings at exercise prices that are equal to their respective construction costs.”  
The next paper, Reading [14], again by Cappoza and Helsley (1990), develops a model of an 
urban area with growth and uncertainty, thereby providing a synthesis of the literature on 
models of urban growth, in particular durable capital and perfect foresight models and models 
that consider optimal investment decisions under uncertainty. Cappoza and Helsley assume 
that household income, rents and prices for land all follow stochastic processes – hence the 
title of the paper; the stochastic city. They demonstrate that in their framework, even though 
investors are assumed to be risk neutral, uncertainty affects both land rents and land prices in 
equilibrium. This is because conversion of land from agricultural to urban use is irreversible. 
Urban growth affects both urban and agricultural land prices but not rent levels. The impact of 
uncertainty in their framework is fourfold. First, it delays land conversion from agricultural to 
urban use. Second, uncertainty induces an option value to agricultural land. Third, it causes 
land at the urban boundary to sell for more than its opportunity cost in other uses (the real 
option value). Fourth, uncertainty reduces equilibrium city size. 
The final paper in this Section, Reading [15], Bulan et al. (2009), provides empirical evidence 
for the real options framework over alternative models such as simple risk aversion and 
quantifies the extent to which uncertainty – through creating a real option to wait – delays 
investment. Using data on condominium developments in Vancouver, B.C., built between 
1979 and 1998, they find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead 
developers to delay new real estate investments. A one-standard deviation increase in the 
return volatility reduces the probability of investment by about 13 percent – the same 
reduction in development as triggered by a 9 percent reduction in prices. One additional novel 
contribution of Bulan and co-authors is that they explore the impact of competition on the 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and investment propensity. They demonstrate that 
increases in the number of potential competitors located near a development project diminish 
this negative relationship, suggesting that competition erodes real option values.  
 
III WHAT GETS CAPITALISED?   
This section includes a range of contributions exploring the extent to which attributes of land 
and locations get capitalised into the price of land. The short answer seems to be that under 
the right circumstances almost everything one can measure; not just the existing ‘quantity’ of 
an amenity or environmental good or bad but apparently expected future values of those 
attributes of land. There are qualifications relating to the supply conditions of land (discussed 
in Section IV) and the extent to which houses or other property is correctly conceptualised as 
an asset not just a flow of current services but, such caveats aside, the evidence suggests that 
the land market is quite remarkably efficient at reflecting even nuanced differences in local 
crime (Gibbons, 2004), for example, or expected future noise disturbance. The papers in this 
section have been chosen because they represent studies of a wide range of attributes of urban 
locations: local public goods such as schools; amenities such as open space; changes in 
accessibility or expected future changes in ambient noise (from aircraft). The final selection 
[Reading 19] investigates both theoretically and empirically how these price effects (or 
capitalisation effects) relate to changes in willingness to pay, welfare changes. 
Reading [16], Cheshire and Sheppard (2004), builds on an earlier study of the same housing 
market (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995) but focuses on the effects of differences in school 
quality on housing prices. Perhaps a major contribution of the earlier study had been to 
explore in the context of an explicit land rent function the extent to which the locational 
attributes of housing really were capitalised into land prices (not just ‘left’ in the value of 
houses). The study reproduced here was far from the first to evaluate the impact of school 
quality on house prices and in some ways the methodology was, as the authors explain, 
deliberately a little old fashioned (compared, for example, to Black, 1999; or Gibbons and 
Machin, 2003). This was because the authors wanted to isolate the impact of not just school 
quality but the quality of different types of schools and how the value of school quality 
interacted with other attributes (such as the capacity of the physical structure of homes to 
accommodate children) and varied with the risk of future changes. Another advantage they 
perceived of their technique was that it estimated not an average price associated with the 
quality of local schools but a price function. This, they found, implied that price was strongly 
non-linear with respect to measured school quality and the real premium attracted for houses 
in better school catchment areas came at the very top of the distribution of school quality 
where ‘free’ state (public) schools were competing with private schools. This non-linearity was 
confirmed in the context of the US by a later study by Chiodo et al., 2010. This implies that the 
price associated with access to better local schools can only be estimated once both the 
characteristics of the house and the measure (and risk of change) of school quality are known. 
The findings were nevertheless striking. In the context of the housing market they analysed, in 
which access to any given school was almost absolutely determined by the address of the 
house, moving a house with the mean characteristics of the whole sample from the worst to 
the best primary school was associated with a price increase of 33.5 percent and from the 
worst to the best secondary school with an increase of 18.7 percent. 
Reading [17] by Anderson and West tackles the value of access to open space. Again this is not 
the first study in this area (Irwin, 2002, for example, looked at this in a quite convincing way) 
but it is the first convincingly to chase down the way in which the value of green open space 
varies with not just the character of that space1 but its context. By this is meant the interaction 
between such factors as the local neighbourhood demographic composition, its mean incomes 
and density as well as a systematic variation according to distance from the CBD. To illustrate 
the findings, if the green space was a golf course it was more highly valued the closer it was to 
the CBD but also if the neighbourhood demographic was over weighted with the middle-aged 
group. The value of public green space rose as the private supply fell; that is, controlling for 
distance from the city centre, it had greater value in higher density neighbourhoods. Results 
also suggested a strong income elasticity of demand for open space; everything else equal it 
was more valuable in higher income neighbourhoods. One puzzle left unsolved is the 
relationship between the value of open space and local crime rates. Anderson and West found 
a not very well-determined positive relationship between the value of open space and the local 
crime rate. This was investigated more fully by Troy and Grove (20008) who found that if one 
                                                 
1
 Irwin’s 2002 contribution had been to show that the more permanently green space was safeguarded, the 
greater its value tended to be but otherwise greenspace was not much differentiated. On the other hand one 
could add her findings to the balance sheet of evidence favouring the conclusion that land markets capitalise not 
just current values but expected future ones too. 
 
disaggregated local parks by local crime rate they systematically fell in value as the crime rate 
rose and in neighbourhoods with the highest crime rates relative to the city average parks 
became ‘disamenities’; people were willing to pay a premium to live further away from them. 
Reading [18], by Gibbons and Machin, 2005, investigates a specific aspect of one of the 
fundamentals of urban land markets, the centre of the models of Alonso (1964) or Mills (1967): 
that is accessibility – or changes in it. They analyse willingness to pay for transport 
improvements in London in 1999 when the metro-style transit system (the ‘tube’ or 
‘underground’) and a light rail system were extended at the same time. Their approach is a 
methodologically innovative adaptation of the classic hedonic model employed in the two 
previous readings. It is quasi-experimental, using repeat sales price information and 
meticulously comparing the before and after effect. They argue this is the ‘conceptually more 
attractive approach’ since it makes the identification of the causal role of the transport change 
more transparent. They identify a statistically and economically highly significant, distance 
dependent effect. Whether this gives a more precise estimate of the actual willingness to pay is 
open to question, however, since their actual estimate might be downward biased because of 
omitted anticipation effects.. They compare their results with a conventional cross-sectional 
analysis over the whole extent of London with proximity to stations as a control. This method 
they find gives a larger estimated willingness to pay for access to the rail network serving 
London. As they acknowledge ‘this might be [because] there are price changes in anticipation 
of the new lines opening’ (i.e. they did not really fully capture the ‘before’ situation); but they 
judge it more likely that the larger effect reflects omitted variables because anticipatory 
capitalisation requires housing to be treated as an asset and it is implausible that buyers would 
be willing to take the bus to work for a prolonged period before the new stations opened. That 
is, however, a judgement and there is evidence from other studies that there can be 
anticipation even by owner occupiers. 
The next selection, Reading [19], by Kuminoff and Pope (2014) changes focus to factors other 
than supply side considerations (discussed in Hilber and Mayer, 2009) that drive a wedge 
between capitalisation effects and the public’s willingness-to-pay for local public goods and 
services, amenities or externalities. Kuminoff and Pope illustrate that in a setting with trading 
between heterogeneous buyers and sellers in a market, capitalization effects may not 
necessarily have a welfare interpretation comparable to that of Rosen’s (1974) hedonic model, 
which assumes perfectly elastic local demand for housing and thus implies full capitalisation. 
The authors stress that it is often unclear how to interpret capitalisation effects in the hedonic 
model because of the economic implications maintained in that model. One critical 
assumption is that the gradient of the hedonic price function is constant over time. As the 
authors point out, this assumption is problematic; even small changes in an amenity can 
trigger tipping effects, via Tiebout sorting,  that can produce large changes in other features of 
equilibria. Thus, it is unclear how to interpret capitalisation effects even in settings with 
perfectly elastic housing demand, where the price elasticity of supply should no longer affect 
the extent of capitalisation. In the empirical part of the paper the authors use boundary 
discontinuity designs and focus on school quality to show that capitalisation effects may 
understate parents’ willingness-to-pay for public (state) school improvements by as much as 
75 percent. It is important to note here that regardless of the welfare interpretation of 
capitalisation effects, their accurate measurement is vital, also from a political economy or 
distribution point of view (Hilber, forthcoming). This is because capitalisation effects matter – 
in opposite directions – for property owners (homeowner and landlords) and renters.    
The last Reading [20] in this section, by Mense and Kholodilin (2014), tackles directly the issue 
of how far expectations of future attributes of locations get capitalised in house prices. They 
have the nice test bed of a natural experiment: the planning, announcement and then revision 
of flight paths associated with the development of the new Berlin-Brandenburg International 
Airport. This is a good test-bed because it was announced long in advance (in 2004); and its 
impact and the details of its planning were very widely publicised in advance; its flight paths 
were announced initially in 2010 but changed, then later finalised, in 2011. It was initially 
scheduled to open in 2012 but design and construction faults associated with fire safety, meant 
that opening was postponed to 2014 and then postponed again. In 2016 it was still not open. 
Thus any measured price changes in housing markets reflecting the noise generated by aircraft 
are all anticipatory. Mense and Kholodilin in fact do not use transactions prices but offer or 
asking prices. They investigate the difference this makes, adjusting for time on the market 
(other research suggesting this was related to the size of the ultimate discount of transactions 
from asking price) and then comparing subsamples more and less affected by the expected 
noise. From this they conclude their estimates likely underestimate the capitalised effect of 
expected noise but they cannot quantify this likely bias. However they carefully model the 
likely noise from proposed take-off paths and find significant discounts varying with 
projected height of aircraft and slant angles. 
 
IV REGULATING LAND MARKETS    
Land markets are amongst the most highly regulated of all markets yet until recently 
economists have not paid much attention to either the economic effects of such regulation or to 
its rationale. This section gathers together readings mainly investigating the effects of 
regulation. Most focus on the impact of land use planning and its impact on housing and 
welfare.  
Land use regulation and the constraints it places on the supply of ‘urban space’ can take many 
forms. These include restrictive and delayed planning permissions, height restrictions, 
preserved view corridors, conservation areas and other preservation policies, minimum lot 
size restrictions and other types of exclusionary zoning, as well as urban containment policies 
such as the imposition of Green Belt’ or ‘growth boundaries’.  
To understand why the main focus of interest has been on the impact of regulation on housing 
consider the land use patterns for England and in particular for London. Table 1 illustrates 
land use patterns for three areas of the country: Greater London; the region of the South East; 
and England as a whole. 



















London 8.7 4.7 12.2 0.8 1.1 27.5 23.8 38.2 22.1 2.8 7.5 64.8 159.6 
South East 1.3 0.7 2.4 0.1 0.1 4.6 6.2 84.8 16.6 2.7 1.6 93.7 1,938.7 
England 1.1 0.7 2.2 0.1 0.1 4.3 4.3 87.5 12.4 2.6 1.4 94.3 13,232.4 
Source: London First (2015) 
Land for residents - under housing and in domestic gardens, covers about one third of the 
Greater London Authority (GLA) - the jurisdictional area of London. If one adds urban green 
space to get a total of all land used for consumption purposes, rather than for production, then 
60.7 percent of land use in London is for residential related purposes. This suggests that land 
used for housing related consumption makes up an important share of total land use and 
regulation of such land is thus crucial to both urban form and, because regulatory constraints 
determine the long-term responsiveness of housing supply to demand shocks, the cost of 
housing. 
The economically thriving GLA has one of the oldest and most restrictive policies of urban 
containment and preservation in the world, making it a particularly interesting to study. 
Reflecting its varied and powerful containment and preservation policies, London is a very 
‘green city’ with 52 percent of the GLA area covered by domestic gardens or green space. 
Commercial buildings and transport use only 18.8 percent of the land. It has a Green Belt, on 
which it is nearly impossible to get any planning permission, surrounding the urbanised area 
with its boundaries more or less static since 1955 (Hall, 1975). Even within the GLA 
jurisdiction, the Green Belt occupies 32,500 hectares, 22.1 percent of the land – mostly as 
private farmland. But the 32,500 hectares of Green Belt within the GLA is dwarfed by the more 
than 480,000 hectares of Green Belt land surrounding the GLA, in the rest of southern 
England.  
It is these Green Belt constraints, in conjunction with all other planning policies aimed at 
preserving, protecting or containing that make residential land artificially scarce (across 
England as a whole houses and their gardens cover only some 5.4 percent of all space with all 
other buildings and transport adding another 3.1 percent) and housing some of the dearest in 
the world; according to some measure2, the second most expensive in the world. Planning 
restrictions thus have benefits in the form of preserved open space or historical heritage but 
they also produce a serious increase in housing costs. 
Reading [21] by Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002, is the first attempt rigorously to quantify the 
impact on welfare, measured as income equivalent, of land/space supply restrictions operated 
through the planning system. Most systems of planning or land use regulation restrict 
development in at least some locations. There are good economic reasons for doing so since 
land markets are subject to endemic problems of market failure and, unregulated, will 
undersupply public open space, both  in urban and country parks, or National Parks; fail to 
protect valued scenery and habitat; and not fully reflect any environmental costs of different 
patterns of development. Restricting supply will at least locally increase the price of housing 
(though this may reflect the social value attached to not developing particular tracts of land 
such as habitat or scenic areas). So attempts to estimate the economic effects of planning may 
evaluate the effect on prices of houses; and if they do that they may also try to include the 
impact of higher land prices on the characteristics of houses. Higher land prices will cause 
land to be substituted out of house production – new houses will be smaller as well as more 
expensive – and if people value space in houses (and gardens) then there will be a welfare loss 
associated with the reduced size/increased density of housing as well foregone income paying 
for it. However if planning also produces amenities – as the example of protecting valued 
scenery or urban open space implies – then the net cost will not be measured by the increase in 
house prices even fully adjusting for reduced space because of the welfare gains from the 
increased supply of amenity or environmental public goods.   
So Reading [21] starts from micro-level data on house transactions and  the characteristics of 
the buyers of those transacted houses to estimate a structure of demand for housing 
characteristics including as attributes a simplified representation of amenities generated by 
planning; namely separation of industrial and residential land uses; and the provision for two 
different types of open space: i) that which is publically accessible, mainly urban parks, inside 
the urban area and ii) privately owned land without public access mainly in the form of ‘Green 
Belt’ or equivalent land surrounding the urban area. Using this estimated structure of demand, 
the estimated land price function derived from the hedonic model, and the observed incomes 
of the households in the transacted houses, Cheshire and Sheppard then estimate the implied 
indirect utility function associated with the observed situation, calibrated in money terms. It is 
then possible to estimate the equivalent variation in income (the welfare change expressed in 
money terms) that would be associated with supplying more land via the planning system but 
at the expense of less land in open space and more mixing of industrial and residential uses. 
This produces two measures of the impact on net welfare of the observed level of restriction 
                                                 
2
 According to Globalpropertyguide.com (last accessed 6/2016) the buying price per square metre of housing in the UK 
(London) is the second highest in the world, topped only by the tiny city state and income tax haven Monaco. 
 
on urban development: i) a mild relaxation, modelled by allowing the total urban footprint to 
expand until the price of land at the edge was estimated to have fallen by about 25 percent; 
then ii) a further relaxation sufficient to allow the price of land at the urban fringe to fall to 
what was judged to be the lowest possible price necessary to secure any transfer of 
agricultural land to housing. In both these scenarios internal space constraints were also 
relaxed so that they were close to the lowest observed in the least restrictive English city 
examined. And in both scenarios the loss of valued planning-produced amenities entailed in 
supplying more land for housing was included in the net measure. The final result was that 
the biggest welfare gain was associated with the most significant relaxation of constraints. This 
implied that the existing restrictive policy entailed a loss of household income equivalent to a 
tax of 3.9 percent and that this relaxation would be associated with a 71 percent increase in the 
urbanised area compared to the status quo. Since the estimates were based on individual 
observations it was also possible to explore the distributional consequences of these changes. 
The next Reading [22] by Fischel, 2001, is in some ways a complement. Central to the Cheshire 
and Sheppard net welfare estimates is their measurement in terms of income equivalent. This 
is a flow. Fischel looks at the reasons for restrictive planning in terms of asset values – wealth:  
a stock measure. His argument is that as the relative price of houses increases so housing 
becomes a relatively more significant element in individuals’ asset portfolios. Since houses are 
immobile and not very liquid as assets this means that home-owners are faced with an 
increasingly powerful incentive to defend the value of their homes – their most important 
assets – and they will do this by voting for more restrictive local planning regimes. So local 
government is conceptualised as a corporation maximising the value of its residents’ homes. It 
does this by means of its control over zoning and development on the one hand and taxes and 
the supply of local public goods, such as schools, on the other. Thus it has the capacity to 
increase the value of its ‘homevoter’ residents’ assets both by restricting supply and improving 
the (capitalised) value of local public goods. 
A few more recent studies have tried to causally link regulatory restrictiveness to house prices. 
Reading [23], Quigley and Raphael (2005), is a short paper and provides some early direct 
evidence for California that local regulatory stringency is a key driver of local housing costs. 
The starting point of their analysis is the observation that regulatory stringency varies widely 
across Californian local jurisdictions. This is in part because California has the most extreme 
form of autarky in land-use regulation of any U.S. state. Quigley and Raphael also point to the 
tax system as a determinant of the stringency of land use planning – a theme that we will 
revisit when discussing Reading [26]. Property taxes are strictly limited to 1 percent – thus 
providing few fiscal incentives to permit residential development – while local jurisdictions 
are permitted a share of local sales tax receipts, in turn incentivising retail developments over 
housing. Empirically, Quigley and Raphael find strong evidence in support of their 
proposition that local regulatory stringency affects local costs of owner-occupied and rental 
housing. Consistent with this, they also find that new housing construction is lower in more 
regulated cities and that the supply price elasticity of housing varies depending on a city’s 
regulatory stringency.  
Reading [24], Saiz (2010) approaches the issue of house prices and regulatory constraints from 
another direction. His starting point is a very painstaking study of the topography of all the 
metro areas in the continental US using remote sensing data to calculate physical constraints 
on urban land supply: land lost to sea or fresh water or to slopes too steep for building. He 
finds considerable variation in this across cites but, more interestingly, that the extent of 
physical constraints on land supply is itself highly correlated with the severity of regulatory 
constraints (estimated using the Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index). He then 
develops an extension of the familiar monocentric city model to show that not just levels but 
growth in house prices should be expected to be determined by these space constraints 
because they will influence not just the size of the housing stock but the price elasticity of 
supply, so its response to price changes. Housing supply is thus a function of both physical 
and regulatory restrictions on space. Deploying the Fischel ‘Homevoter’ argument of Reading 
[22] and examining house price growth over time across metro areas, he concludes that in fact 
there is reverse causation with physical constraints tending to increase house prices all else 
equal and then those higher prices generating an incentive for more restrictive regulation. 
Estimated supply elasticities by metro area thus ultimately stem from physical constraints but 
these interact with the incentives to have more restrictive local regulation. 
Reading [25] by Glaeser and Ward (2009) empirically explore the causes and consequences of 
land use regulation, focusing on the regulatory microcosm of the Greater Boston area. They 
first document that the number of land use regulations has been increasing strongly over time 
and varies very widely over space. The only factor that is able to predict local regulatory 
restrictiveness is historic density levels. They then document that minimum lot size 
restrictions and other types of land use controls are associated with reductions in new 
construction activity, consistent with the notion that land use controls are a production 
restraint on housing. Interestingly, Glaeser and Ward find that local regulations are not 
associated with higher local house prices once they control for contemporary density and 
demographics. They rationalise this finding with the proposition that municipalities in the 
Greater Boston area are sufficiently close substitutes, so that local supply constraints do not 
affect local prices. In a setting with nearly perfect substitutability, supply constraints would 
still matter, but only at the aggregate – Greater Boston area – level. Put differently, the authors 
argue that housing demand may be pretty elastic across municipalities within the metro area. 
They state that “[t]he same abundance of similar, small jurisdictions that makes Greater 
Boston a natural place to examine the impact of land use controls on new construction makes 
the area a much less natural place to examine the impact of land use controls on price. There 
are so many close substitutes for most towns that we would not expect restricting of housing 
supply in one town to raise prices in that town relative to another town with similar 
demographics and density levels. Restrictions on building in one suburban community should 
not raise prices in that community relative to another town with equivalent amenities, any 
more than restrictions on the production of Saudi Arabian crude will raise the price of Saudi 
Arabian crude relative to Venezuelan crude. Of course, Saudi Arabia’s quantity restrictions 
will still raise the global price of oil, but this cannot be seen by comparisons of prices across oil 
producers.”  
Although this argument has some intuitive appeal, it is at least questionable whether towns in 
the Greater Boston area are indeed close substitutes, similar to Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan 
crude oil. In this context, it is worth pointing out two other recent studies (Hilber and Mayer, 
2009; Lutz, 2015) that have focused on the Massachusetts-New Hampshire area (with the 
Boston area at its core) do find evidence suggesting that differing price responses to demand 
shocks can be attributed to differing housing supply price elasticities, which in turn are 
determined by physical or regulatory supply constraints.   
Reading [26] by Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) revisits Glaeser and Ward’s (2009) proposition 
for Greater Boston that within metro areas differences in local supply constraints may not 
matter much for the extent to which demand shocks are capitalised into house prices. Hilber 
and Vermeulen point out that while small towns in the Boston area may indeed be fairly close 
substitutes, the same is not true for example for different metro areas in the US or for Local 
Authorities in the UK. They also refer to recent theoretical work that assumes heterogeneity in 
tastes (in the spirit of Readings [27] and [33] discussed below). In such a setting, “local supply 
constraints may raise prices because they constrain the number of households so that the 
marginal household has a higher willingness to pay for residing in a particular place.”  
 
Hilber and Vermeulen develop a simple theoretical framework to make a point in case, 
demonstrating that under realistic assumptions (households have idiosyncratic tastes and sort 
endogenously over heterogeneous locations), local long-term supply constraints can be 
expected to influence the house price-earnings elasticity.  The authors then go on to test their 
sole theoretical prediction that house prices respond more strongly to changes in local demand 
shocks in places with tight supply constraints. Focusing on local planning authorities in 
England and exploiting a unique panel dataset that spans 35 years, the authors identify three 
different types of local long-term supply constraints: regulatory constraints, constraints arising 
from physical scarcity of developable land, and uneven topography. Addressing various 
endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable technique and instruments to identify 
their measures for regulatory restrictiveness and physical degree of development, the authors 
find that regulatory constraints – in conjunction with strong demand – are the main cause of 
the extraordinarily high prices in large parts of England, especially the Greater London Area 
and the South East of the country. Scarcity of developable land matters too, in a causal sense, 
but the effect is highly non-linear – essentially confined to highly urbanized areas. Finally, 
topography matters in a statistical sense but the effect is small quantitatively. Another 
interesting result is that the adverse effects of supply constraints are stronger during boom 
than bust periods, consistent with the ‘kinked supply curve’ argument in Reading [12].  
Reading [27], Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013), complements the other papers in this section 
in that it focuses on the origins (or causes) of land use regulation rather than their economic 
impact. The starting point of their analysis is the simple observation that “the spreading 
adoption of land use regulations is a phenomenon that seems to accompany the rise of 
urbanization”. Interestingly, they point out that San Francisco and New York – two ‘superstar 
cities’ – were the first cities in the U.S. to adopt some form of zoning laws. The two ‘superstar 
cities’ were not only the first cities to adopt stringent regulations, they are now also amongst 
the most tightly regulated cities in the country. Hilber and Robert-Nicoud provide an original 
explanation for these stylised facts. Employing a discrete choice model, in which a given 
population of mobile households has heterogeneous tastes over a set of cities, the authors 
model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between 
owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Stringent land use controls benefit the 
owners of developed land via increasing property prices but hurt the owners of undeveloped 
land via increasing development costs. Hence, more desirable locations can be expected to be 
more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, more regulated. One 
important contribution of the formal theory is that it expands the dominant political 
economics view (Reading [22]) by assuming that planning boards cater to the interests of all 
landowners. Instead of modelling local land use restrictions purely as the outcome of majority 
voting by homeowners versus renters, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud stress an alternative 
mechanism in addition to voting: lobbying. Owners of undeveloped land and owners of 
developed land (homeowners and landlords) form two competing lobbies that influence 
planning boards by way of lobbying contributions in a ‘one-dollar-one-vote’ system. This 
contrasts to a voting model that gives an implicit weight of one to owners to occupants 
(homeowners and renters) but no weight at all to landlords (because they cannot vote) or 
owners of undeveloped land. Hilber and Robert-Nicoud also provide strong evidence for a 
sample of US metropolitan areas that is consistent with their model of landowner influence.   
The next Reading [28], (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2005) focuses primarily on the effects on 
housing prices of more restrictive zoning (or planning). Their main focus is, as the title 
suggests, housing in Manhattan but they include a brief analysis of office buildings in 
Manhattan and a comparative analysis - using a different measure of the cost of restrictiveness 
- for 21 of the biggest metro areas in the US.  
They start by providing some descriptive evidence of the fall in the construction of new high 
rise buildings in Manhattan and the increase in the costs of space. They describe regulatory 
restrictions and provide some case studies of successful battles to prevent new building. Their 
central estimate of the impact of these restrictions on the costs of housing in Manhattan 
employs the idea of a ‘regulatory tax’. This is defined as the difference between the marginal 
costs of constructing an additional square foot of space and its price. In a free, unregulated and 
competitive market, construction would continue up to the point at which the costs (price) of 
an extra unit of space just equalled the cost of producing it. Given that the development 
industry is competitive (a point they deploy some evidence to support) then the difference 
between the observed price – in a competitive market, equal to the marginal revenue – and the 
observed costs of producing an extra square foot of space, is a measure of the costs of 
regulatory constraints – the ‘regulatory tax’. For individual houses, of course, there is the 
difficult issue of accurately measuring the necessary cost of additional land to support the 
extra – or marginal - unit of space but the authors ingeniously sidestep this problem by 
focusing only on high rise apartment blocks. For these, land costs are given and extra space is 
produced by building higher, so the costs of land drop out of the calculation. 
Their results show that the measured ‘regulatory tax’, while cyclical because housing prices 
are more cyclically sensitive than construction costs, rose over time in Manhattan; was in no 
year zero and since 2001, the price of space in apartments had consistently been more than 
double that of the costs of producing it. They argue that in commercial zones tenants have no 
interest in opposing construction or maximising the value of the buildings they occupy, so 
expect the ‘regulatory tax’ to be much lower for commercial buildings. This they find is the 
case. In some years the costs of construction were higher than the price of office space and 
never exceeded it by more than 50 percent.  
Reading [29], Cheshire and Hilber, 2008, is the only study of the effects of regulatory 
restrictiveness on non-residential property with the exception of the short section in Reading 
[28] which found no measurable cost was imposed on office space in Manhattan. The situation 
in the UK, and to a lesser extent in Europe, is significantly different the authors point out. 
Indeed their motivating evidence is the costs of office space in Birmingham, a declining 
industrial city in the British midlands. As would be expected, construction costs for office 
space in Birmingham were only about 50 percent of those in Manhattan; but the price of office 
space was 44 percent more than in Manhattan. Applying the same measure of the costs 
imposed as employed by Glaeser et al, 2005 they estimate that the price of a marginal square 
foot of office space in Birmingham, averaged over a 6 year period to 2005, was in fact 2.50 
times the costs of building it. This was not the highest measured ‘regulatory tax’ however: in 
London’s West End the comparable figure was 8, about 5 in the City of London and about 4 in 
Frankfurt or Stockholm. So the evidence was of really large costs imposed on the occupiers of 
office space in all British office centres (partially excepting Newcastle) and nearly all European 
ones. The only European city where the estimated ‘regulatory tax’ approached that of 
Manhattan was Brussels. 
The authors also provide an analysis showing quite convincingly that the ‘regulatory tax’ 
measure really did capture the impact of regulatory restrictiveness. Changes in it and 
variations across cities were driven not by demand side factors but by supply constraints. 
There was evidence that local restrictiveness responded to the value communities attached to 
job creation – the regulatory tax fell as local unemployment rose, controlling for demand. 
Moreover there was additional evidence supporting the important role of incentives in 
moderating planning restrictiveness. In the UK in 1990, business property taxes were changed 
from a local to a national tax, removing any fiscal incentive at all from local jurisdictions to 
allow office development. They were legally required to provide services for any new 
buildings but new buildings transparently generated no local revenues. Because one of the 
most important jurisdictions – in the context of office space -–was exempt (the City of 
London), it was possible to estimate the impact this change in incentives had, via its tighter 
restriction on supply, on the costs of office space. This turned out to be larger than any feasible 
business property tax would have been. 
 
V TAXES AND LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS    
Reading [30] by Tiebout (1956) is the most cited paper in this volume – perhaps in spatial 
economics. It is simple but original and ingenious, tackling an issue very current at the time it 
was written and still relevant today. A colourful account of its origins and intellectual context 
is provided in Leven (2003). Samuelson (1954b) had just published a paper arguing that for 
‘pure public goods’ there was an all but insolvable problem of gauging demand. Individual 
demands were additive but the incentives were not to reveal true preferences but to ‘free ride’ 
on the choices and taxes of others. This, Tiebout argued, was logically correct for those public 
goods produced by central government but did not apply to local public goods or 
expenditures. For these consumers could ‘vote with their feet’ (Tiebout may have invented this 
phrase - he certainly popularised it). On the assumption that access to a given local public 
good depended on living within the jurisdiction (reasonable for schools if not so reasonable for 
some other local public goods) and ‘consumer-voters’ were free to move between jurisdictions, 
then they could choose to live in the jurisdiction offering the mix of public goods and taxes 
most suited to their preferences and incomes – their demand for local public goods. Given 
certain assumptions about the form of the production function for local public goods of 
varying types and the structure of demand for different mixes of local public goods, one can 
think of a varying set of ‘optimal community sizes’. This will provide incentives for local 
communities either to attract additional residents if they are below their ‘optimum’ size or 
price residents out if they are above that size. As Tiebout concludes, his model implies that in 
a country with a federal structure such as the US, where many, even the majority of, public or 
collective goods are locally provided, there does exist an effective system of preference 
signalling; a point on which Samuelson had concluded most negatively that ‘no decentralized 
pricing system could serve to determine optimally…levels of collective consumption’. 
Reading [31], Oates (1969), is the natural complement to the Tiebout article. It is essentially an 
empirical test, if not of the Tiebout model, then of whether the world is consistent with some 
Tiebout processes taking place. The starting point is that logically the incentive to move 
jurisdictions – or to select a particular jurisdiction if moving – is the discounted net difference 
in the flow of expected future tax payments compared to the discounted value flow of services 
from local public goods. It is an early empirical study of capitalisation effects before access to 
powerful computing and large micro data sets was readily available. Reflecting this limit on 
computing power it analyses mean values for a cross-section of 53 suburban jurisdictions of 
the New York metro region. The author is aware of what would now be called the problems of 
endogeneity and uses a Two Stage Least Squares (instrumental variable) approach to offset for 
bias. The conclusion is that indeed higher property taxes are negatively capitalised and that 
better quality local public services – crudely proxied by expenditure per pupil in local schools 
– are positively capitalised. Indeed the impact of better local public goods on the value of 
houses likely exceeds that of the increase in local property taxes necessary to pay for the 
improvement. 
A few studies that followed up on Oates’ seminal paper are particularly noteworthy as they 
have critical implications for empirical research. In particular, Brueckner (1979, 1982 [Reading 
32] and 1983), in a series of articles, developed a bid-rent framework of property value 
determination, which considers a world that is not in perfect Tiebout-equilibrium. In 
Brueckner’s framework, local governments finance the provision of local public services from 
a local property tax, with the aim of maximising the value of the local housing stock. 
Households are assumed to be freely mobile between locations, have homogenous tastes but 
heterogeneous incomes. Hence, they bid for units until the utility is the same everywhere. As a 
result, both a household’s marginal willingness to pay for local public services and the local 
property tax are fully capitalised into house prices. In such a setting local governments should 
set the level of public expenditures such that the capitalised tax needed to finance a further 
rise in services just offsets the capitalised willingness to pay for them. If this condition is met, 
then the public expenditure level is efficient in that it satisfies the Samuelson condition, which 
states that at the margin, the aggregate willingness to pay for additional services equals the 
cost of providing them. 
Reading [32], Brueckner (1982), builds on this proposition, to derive an empirical test for 
Pareto-efficiency. The idea is as follows: suppose that for some reason spending on public 
services is below the level which maximises the value of the aggregate housing stock. This 
could be for example because of institutional constraints such as property tax limits. In this 
case, the capitalised willingness to pay for an increase in expenditure exceeds the capitalised 
tax required to pay for it. Put differently, an increase in expenditure capitalises ‘more than 
fully’ into house prices. The converse is true for the case of overspending, which leads to less 
than full capitalisation. Illustrated graphically; aggregate property values of a local jurisdiction 
are an inverted U-shaped function of the level of public good provision. Brueckner, in his 1982 
paper, also provides empirical evidence, using cross-sectional data, for a sample of 
Massachusetts communities. Employing an equation that omits local taxes, a negative 
coefficient on local spending can be interpreted as over-provision, while a positive coefficient 
implies under-provision. Brueckner find coefficients for education and non-education 
spending that are not statistically different from zero, implying  no systematic tendency to 
either under- or overprovide local public goods. Bradbury et al. (2001) and Hilber and Mayer 
(2009) provide more refined empirical analyses in the same spirit, also looking at 
Massachusetts but exploiting panel data and exogenous variation arising from the property 
tax limit ‘Proposition 2½ ‘, finding under-provision of local public good provision.  
One shortcoming of Brueckner’s framework is that it builds on some restrictive assumptions, 
perhaps most critically; costless mobility, homogeneity of tastes and perfect substitutability of 
locations. Reading [33], Arnott and Stiglitz (1979), provide an early theoretical discussion of a 
theoretical framework that incorporates heterogeneous tastes—the key element of the Tiebout 
(1956) model. In section 3.3 of their paper they consider the case “in which individuals differ 
solely in terms of their valuation of an amenity resource such as the quality of a beach”. If 
places are inherently different (some offer access to a beach; others don’t) and households vary 
in their appreciation for these differences, intercommunity differences in land rents will no 
longer capture inframarginal benefits. This has important consequences for the interpretation 
of capitalisation studies: “When individuals are not identical, differences in land rents 
between communities systematically underestimate the value of their differences in amenities, 
and systematically overestimate the cost of their differences in disamenities.” Arnott and 
Stiglitz provide an intuitive example for the case of a public bad such as noise. For noise, 
intercommunity differences in land rents provide a consistent overestimate of costs. This is 
because the cost of noise to the marginal individual is larger than the cost to inframarginal 
individuals in the noisy community, who through self-selection are those who are not 
particularly bothered by noise. Another implication of heterogeneity in tastes is that it makes 
the demand curve for living in a certain place become downward sloping (in contrast to the 
hedonic model or the Rosen (1974)-Roback (1982) framework, which implicitly assume a 
perfectly elastic demand curve). Downward sloping demand also introduces a role for supply 
conditions because capitalisation can be expected to be stronger in locations where housing 
supply is less elastic.  
The treatment of heterogeneous tastes is only one aspect of the seminal paper by Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1979), which more broadly explores the relationship between aggregate land rents and 
public expenditure in a residential urban economy and the generality of the Henry George 
Theorem (HGT). The HGT suggests that in a spatial economy where (i) spatial concentration of 
economic activity is due to a pure local public good and (ii) population size is optimal, 
aggregate land rents equal the expenditure on the public good. It implies that a confiscatory 
tax on land rents is not only efficient but also the ’single tax’ necessary to finance the public 
good. Arnott and Stiglitz demonstrate that the theorem is more robust than had been 
previously thought but is still far from completely general. 
Another important contribution of Arnott and Stiglitz’s paper is that they discuss two sources 
of market failure – not previously treated in the literature – that drive a wedge into the 
prediction by Tiebout (1956) that preference revelation results in a spatial distribution of 
population that would be Pareto-optimal. Specifically, they point out that if local residents (i) 
do not face or (ii) misperceive the social benefits or costs of an in-migrant, a Pareto-efficient 
solution is not competitively sustainable.  
Most previous tests of the Tiebout model can be described as indirect or implicit; their focus is 
on deductive implications of the model. Examples are Readings [31] and [32]. Direct tests of 
Tiebout’s ‘voting with the feet’ mechanism – actual migratory responses to local public good 
provision – have been rare. The last reading in this volume, Reading [34], by Banzhaf and 
Walsh (2008) provides such a direct test – perhaps the most rigorous empirical test to date of 
the ‘voting with the feet’ mechanism. Banzhaf and Walsh first derive a locational equilibrium 
model that makes two key predictions: (i) relative increases in population density for 
neighbourhoods that experience exogenous improvements in local public goods and (ii) for 
large improvements, also increased relative mean incomes. The authors use a state of the art 
difference-in-difference strategy to identify the impact of entry and exit of facilities that are 
required to report their releases of chemicals for the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), as well as 
actual changes in air quality (toxicity-weighted emission levels). They provide strong support 
for the proposition that households vote with their feet for local environmental quality: 
migration is strongly correlated with TRI facility emissions and their arrival to or exit from a 
community – defined by half-mile diameter circles rather than local jurisdictions. Moreover, 
Banzhaf and Walsh find that TRI facilities caused the community to become poorer over time, 
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